By Sharna de Lacy

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has been ruling Egypt since the negotiated resignation of President Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011. While attracting initial pubic support, the military has attracted much criticism its for lingering political role, authoritarian practices and resistance to genuine democratic reform.

Recent moves by SCAF to protect its influence in the domestic economy and curtail the constitutional oversight powers of any newly elected government in regard to the military budget has sparked renewed protests, calling for the military to immediately hand power to civilians.

The Armed Forces of Egypt have a long historical role in direct economic participation. As early as the 1820’s the military was involved in the production of weaponry and uniforms, supplementing a shortfall in funding enabling them to be self sufficient and independent from colonial forces. Following the expansion of the state-led economy throughout the 1950’s, these activities grew from the specific needs of the military to the manufacture and sale of civilian products.

Today the military has a considerable interest in the civilian Egyptian economy, through interests held under the auspices of the Ministry for Military Production. The activities of the military are far reaching from small arms production, to childcare, catering and pest control. [P1] Estimates [Sd2] about the profitability and financial structure of military run companies are difficult to obtain, as the revenues derived from these companies are a subject to ‘national security’. Because the economic extra-curricula activities of the military fall under the purview of ‘national security’, this leads to the creation of a ‘shadow budget’ that escapes standard parliamentary and auditing scrutiny.

SCAF is currently taking steps that would ensure that not only off-budget activities but also its official budget exempt from oversight. Draft constitutional principles put forward by SCAF would guarantee the secrecy of the military budget and provide SCAF the power to reject any articles of the new constitution that it objects to as the guardian of ‘constitutional legitimacy’. Joshua Stacher, an expert on Middle Eastern Politics at Kent State University said of the proposal- "It essentially builds SCAF into the political process as a sort of fourth pillar and one that is utterly and completely unaccountable to the people"

The Egyptian press is forbidden from printing material that is critical of the military, and the Interim Constitution has affirmed press censorship in ‘matters related to general safety or the purposes of national security’. This protects the military’s economic interests not only from official examination, but also from public scrutiny, undermining key oversight mechanisms which are central to democracy.

Corruption has been a concern for the protest movement, however, due to the unquantifiable nature of the military’s extensive economic interests it has largely escaped scrutiny.  SCAF responded to public outcry regarding official corruption and has pursued an array of former regime elites on charges of corruption. However, there have been concerns that the SCAF leadership has been utilising public pressure for prosecuting previous regime figures, in order to extend its own economic influence and stifle potential for reform. SCAF has pursued influential liberal economic reformists- forcing former finance minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali from his position and freezing the assets of former trade minister Rachid Mohamed Rachid on  allegations of corruption.

The military’s direct role in political rule may be short-lived. However, SCAF has been utilising the transitional arrangements to influence the future direction of the Egyptian economic structure and sure up its position as the de facto authority in the Egyptian political landscape. How the first elected Egyptian government defines the constitutional role of the armed forces and addresses military reform will be a balancing act that may have long standing implications not only for the Egyptian economy, but for democracy as well.